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ABSTRACT 
The heroin trade is a vital part of the Afghan economy. The heroin trade in 
Afghanistan has represented 40% to 50% of the country's entire gross domestic product 
for the past 30 years. The aim of this study was to examine the heroin trade as a circular 
circuit. Disrupt or break the circuit and the heroin trade comes to a halt. A disruption in 
the drug trade is also a disruption for the insurgency since the majority of the 
insurgency's funding is generated by the heroin trade. Historically, there have been times 
when neighboring borders were closed, poppy crops failed, or eradication efforts were 
stepped up. These all caused disruptions in the heroin trade and slowed the flow of 
heroin leaving Afghanistan and the flow of money going back into the country. By 
studying the heroin trade from this circular perspective, law enforcement will be able to 
initiate ways to step up anti-narcotic efforts on multiple fronts. This will stem the flow of 
heroin leaving Afghanistan and the money coming back in, with an end goal of ending 
the Afghan heroin trade overalL Previous studies have focused on only one aspect of the 
Afghan heroin trade. Using a multi-pronged approach offers the most options for law 
enforcement to launch anti-narcotic efforts against the drug lords and traffickers. 
Keywords: Afghanistan, criminology, heroin trade, circular, disruption, insurgency, 
destabilization, corruption, drug trade 
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Introduction 
Afghanistan is at the heart of the illegal transnational heroin trade emanating from 
the region referred to as the Golden Crescent (Medler, 2005; Chouvy, 2006). The Golden 
Crescent is comprised of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 was the start of the modern transnational heroin trade (Medler, 
2005). The mujahidin resistance fighters to the Soviet invasion needed money to 
purchase weapons to fight the Soviets. Weapons were sold and sent to mujahidin fighters 
by the US government, starting with the Carter administration. The volume of weapons 
sold and sent to Afghanistan increased during the Reagan administration (Medler, 2005). 
The majority of the funds to purchase these weapons were made from the illegal 
heroin trade. Previous studies of the Soviet occupation have shown that the United States 
was not actively involved in the heroin trade, however, Medler (2005) states, "there were 
extensive sins of omission," by the United States (Medler, 2005, p. 275). These sins of 
omission reflected the United States' Cold War strategy against the Soviet Union, where 
Afghanistan was used as a political battleground by the United States. The United States 
averted its eyes from the illegal heroin trade and focused on the damage that the 
mujahidin fighters could do to the Soviets (Medler, 2005). 
These sins of omission continued with the US invasion of Afghanistan in late 
2001 and through the first few years of the Afghan occupation (Jones, 2008). In 2001, 
approximately 350 United States Special Forces soldiers, 100 Central Intelligence 
Agency officers and 15,000 Afghan soldiers overthrew the Taliban regime in less than 
three months (Jones, 2008). The United States suffered one dozen fatalities during the 
initial overthrow. Between 2002 and 2006, the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent 
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groups began a sustained effort with the goal of overthrowing the legitimate Afghan 
government, which was supported by coalition forces (Jones, 2008). 
Previous studies have shown that during this period of time the numbers of 
attacks by insurgents rose by more than 400% and the numbers of deaths from these 
attacks rose by more than 800 % (Jones, 2008). There was a substantial increase of 
violence in 2005 and 2006 where the numbers of insurgent attacks spiked. The number 
of suicide bombings rose from 27 to 139; the number of remotely detonated bombings 
rose from 783 to 1677; and armed attacks rose from 1,558 to 4,542 (Jones, 2008). Also, 
between 2006 and 2007 insurgent-initiated attacks rose an additional 27%. The result of 
these increases in violence was a lack of security for the Afghan population as well as 
coalition forces and a breeding ground for the drug trade and insurgency to flourish 
(Jones, 2008). 
When the United States-led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan, combating the 
drug trade was not a primary focus of the coalition forces. However, as the years passed 
and the insurgency grew and attacks on the Afghan government and coalition forces 
mounted, eyes turned to where the insurgency was acquiring funding. In 2004, John 
Walters, who was the Director for White House Office of Drug Control Policy said, 
"drug cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan are undermining the rule of law and 
putting money in the pockets of the terrorists we are trying to neutralize," (Bagley, 2004, 
p.5). A connection was made between the insurgency and the drug trade. The opium 
trade funded terrorism, inhibited reconstruction and created a financial and locally 
supported power base for the insurgency to launch attacks on coalition forces, further 
destabilizing the government and the country (Taylor, 2004; Johnson, 2007). 
2 
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Destabilization of Afghanistan is the goal of the insurgency_ Destabilization of the 
Afghan government benefits both the insurgency and the drug lords. The poppies that 
produce heroin are grown throughout Afghanistan, however, the majority of cultivation is 
concentrated in the southern and eastern regions of the country (UNODC, 2003; UNODC 
2005; UNODC, 2006; Medler, 2005). These regions are where the drug lords reign 
supreme and the legitimate Afghan government is unable to project power or exert rule of 
law or control. These regions are also where the insurgency launches its attacks and is 
able to avoid capture and detection from government and coalition forces since the 
Afghan government is unable to control these areas (Medler, 2005; Jones, 2008). 
The insurgents are given financial support by the drug lords. With this financial 
support the insurgents purchase weapons, ammunition and bomb-making materials. 
Attacks by these well-armed insurgents are launched against Afghan and coalition force 
targets. Having such an additional well-armed force at the disposal of the drug lords 
benefits their drug trade. As part of the financial support given to the insurgents, the drug 
lords now have an additional armed unit, which aids them in transporting heroin out of 
Afghanistan. The drug lords can protect their heroin convoys, as well as the convoys of 
supplies that are brought back into the country that are required to break down poppies 
and produce and refine heroin. 
High poppy production equals more poppies to produce heroin. More heroin 
means more money to the drug lords. More money for the drug lords means increased 
insurgency funding. This allows the insurgency to continue to launch attacks against the 
legitimate Afghan government and coalition forces. Combined, these factors further 
destabilize the country, thus pushing Afghanistan in the direction both the insurgents and 
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the drug lords want the country to go--a destabilized Afghan government. This 
environment would allow the drug lords to cultivate, produce, refine, transport and export 
heroin with minimal government interference. This would increase profits for the drug 
lords and remove one of their largest obstacles, mainly the anti-drug enforcement efforts 
from the legitimate Afghan government. The insurgency would then realize their goal of 
expelling the foreigners (Coalition forces) and the demise of the legitimate Afghan 
government. 
Since the goal of the insurgency is to destabilize Afghanistan, the drug lords and 
insurgents share a common goal. This common goal provides the basis for why they 
work together to destabilize Afghanistan. The motives for why each particular group 
wants destabilization are irrelevant. The simple fact that they share this common goal is 
the key point to understand and on which to focus. For the drug lords, the heroin trade is 
about power, profit and greed. For the insurgents, the heroin trade is viewed as a means 
to an end. For these reasons and others, applying Conflict Theory would be appropriate. 
Afghan society is divided into areas controlled by the Afghan government and areas 
controlled by the drug lords. The two groups have competing ideas and values (Babbie, 
2010). The group that reigns over a particular Afghan region determines the societal 
controls under which Afghan citizens live. 
Research Purpose 
The purpose of the current research is to show that the drug trade and the 
insurgency are similar to a circular electrical circuit pattern. There are six steps in the 
drug trade; these include: 
1) cultivation of opium poppies to produce heroin; 
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2) production of heroin from the opium; 
3) transportation of the heroin out of Afghanistan into the world market; 
4) distribution and sales of the heroin in the end cities; 
5) subsequent movement of the profits from the sale of the heroin back into 
Afghanistan to the drug lords; 
6) provision of funds by the drug lords to the insurgents. 
A breakdown in anyone of these six areas interrupts the electrical circuit. If such a 
breakdown occurs, the drug trade grinds to a halt until the circuit is reestablished. 
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By examining the relationship between the drug lords and the insurgents as a 
circular electrical pattern, insight may be gained into ways to break the circuit and lessen 
the flow of drugs out of Afghanistan and the flow of money from the heroin trade back 
into Afghanistan. Less money coming back to the drug lords would mean they would 
have less money to give the insurgency, therefore restricting the activities of the 
insurgents and reducing attacks against coalition forces and the legitimate, freely elected 
government of Afghanistan. Rather than Afghanistan becoming a destabilized state 
where the heroin trade would continue unabated, Afghanistan would become a stable and 
centralized government with the ability to project power and rule of law throughout the 
country. Afghanistan would uniformly be able to combat the drug trade and the 
insurgency, thereby eliminating two of the largest obstacles Afghanistan faces in 
becoming an autonomous self-governing country free from international aid. A stable, 
self-sufficient Afghanistan would improve security in the central Asian region, as well as 
improving security in Western countries. Afghanistan would no longer be a haven for 
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Islamic extremists, and the threat of a terrorist attack from Afghan-based extremists 
would be reduced. 
Rationale 
Studying the relationship between the insurgents and the drug lords and their 
common goal of destabilization is vital for the Afghan government's long-term ability to 
govern. From determining the allocation of anti-narcotic resources, to being able to 
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project their legitimate power throughout the country, the Afghan government needs to 
understand the relationship between drug lords and the insurgency. Corruption of 
Afghan government officials and law enforcement officers is a major problem in 
combating the illegal drug trade. The drug lords use their power and money to bribe 
government officials and law enforcement officers to look the other way. This corruption 
is not only happening in Afghanistan but extends to the surrounding border countries of 
Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
Research Questions 
This study will examine the following questions: 
1) Is there is a circular pattern to the Afghan drug trade and the insurgency? 
2) What role do destabilization and corruption play in the heroin drug trade and 
insurgency in Afghanistan? 
Limitations/Delimitations 
Some of the limitations of this study include potentially inaccurate figures and 
statistics gathered by the United Nations and Drug Enforcement Agency (UNODOC), 
due to the illicit nature of the heroin trade. However, the statistics from the World Drug 
Report are universally accepted as the best approximations of the actual drug trade in 
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Afghanistan. An additional limitation of this research is that first-hand interviews about 
the drug trade with actual participants in the trade will not be possible due to the illicit 
nature of the trade and the distance to Afghanistan to conduct interviews. These same 
limitations apply to the insurgency. The majority of the information for this research will 
come from second-source data collected by reporting agencies and previously written 
articles, journals and books. 
Some of the delimitations of this study that can be controlled will be the various 
groups described in this study. Some of the key groups that will be discussed will be the 
Afghan drug lords, Afghan insurgents, Afghan law enforcement personnel, Afghan 
government officials and Allied coalition force personnel. 
Definitions: 
Circular electrical circuit pattern to the drug trade - The Afghan drug trade is similar to an 
electrical circuit. The drug trade is comprised of six components (see below). If a break 
in anyone of these six drug trade components, then the circuit of the drug trade is broken. 
The drug trade comes to a halt until the circuit is re-established. 
Break in the circuit - A break constitutes any type of anti-narcotic law enforcement 
actions aimed at stopping the flow of drugs out of Afghanistan, disrupting distribution 
and transportation networks, growing of poppies to produce heroin or the refinement of 
poppies into heroin. 
Destabilization - Any actions which cause the legitimate government of Afghanistan to 
become unstable. 
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Insurgency - an organized rebellion aimed at overthrowing a constituted government 
through the use of subversion and armed conflict (Farflex, 2011). 
The six steps of the drug trade -
1) cultivation of opium poppies to produce heroin; 
2) production of heroin from the opium; 
3) transportation of the heroin out of Afghanistan into the world market; 
4) distribution and sales of the heroin in the end cities; 
5) subsequent movement of the profits from the sale of the heroin back into 
Afghanistan to the drug lords; 
6) provision of funds by the Afghan drug lords to the Afghan insurgents. 
Taliban - Primary insurgency group most active in Afghanistan 
The criminological theory that will be incorporated into the study is part of Karl 
Marx's Conflict Theory. Conflict Theory views that society is divided into two or more 
groups with competing ideas and values (Babbie, 2010). The group or groups with the 
most power make the laws and control society. In the case of Afghanistan, the two 
groups are the drug lords and the legitimate Afghan government. In Afghanistan, the 
drug lords have the power due to the wealth they obtained from the drug trade. In 
Afghanistan, money equals power. Therefore, since the drug lords have power they are 
able to control vast regions of Afghanistan. Due to the drug lords' power base and the 
inability of the Afghan government to project the rule of law in drug lord controlled 
areas, drug lords are able to make the laws in the areas that they control. The legitimate 
8 
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Afghan government is only able to impose laws and control society in the regions that 
they control. Depending on whose area of control an Afghan citizen inhabits, this will be 
a determining factor as to what kind of behavior an Afghan citizen may participate in. 
Those citizens in the drug-lord-controlled regions will be more inclined to participate in 
poppy cultivation than those citizens in areas controlled by the government. 
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Literature Review 
Afghanistan is the primary player in the opium trade originating from the area of 
Southern Asia referred to as the Golden Crescent. Afghanistan has been the primary 
producer in the world of opium since 1991 (Chouvy, 2006). An estimated 85% to 94% of 
all opium in the world is cultivated in Afghanistan (Chouvy, 2006; United Nations Report 
on Drug and Crime, 2009). The cultivation and trafficking of opium in Afghanistan has 
been a source of funding for the insurgency since the United States led invasion in 2001 
(Medler,2005). Previous literature on the subject has demonstrated evidence that Afghan 
insurgency activities are fueled by proceeds from the illegal heroin trade. A brief history 
of Afghanistan starting with the Soviet Union's invasion in 1979 is an integral 
component of understanding why and how the drug trade is circular in nature and to show 
how the drug trade and insurgency feed off of each other. The historical economics of 
Afghanistan are vital to examine since opium cultivation accounts for almost half of the 
gross domestic product for the country (UNODC, 2003). 
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and changed the country's entire 
economic focus for the next thirty years. Prior to the Soviet invasion, opium cultivation 
and trafficking were not a central feature of the Afghan economy (Carpenter, 2004; 
Chouvy, 2006). The Soviet occupation and subsequent insurgency by Islamic forces 
devastated the countries infrastructure (Carpenter, 2004). Previous studies have shown 
due to the destruction of Afghanistan's infrastructure, traditional forms of agriculture and 
other economic activities were not possible. During the occupation, the Soviets 
destroyed established social institutions in Afghanistan and created what Carpenter 
(2004) described as "widespread economic chaos" (Carpenter, 2004, p. 4). The brutal 
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tactics employed by the Soviets included "bombing villages, burning crops, slaughtering 
livestock and displacing large numbers of people" (Carpenter, 2004, p. 5). These tactics 
angered the Afghan population and helped fuel the fight to remove the Soviets from the 
country. 
The use of these brutal tactics led to the formation ofthe anti-Soviet Afghan 
resistance, which needed money to fund their efforts. The resistance discovered that 
trafficking in opium provided them both a substantial and a reliable source of income 
(Carpenter, 2004). From these beginnings, in a relatively short period of time, 
Afghanistan became the largest producer of opium in the world. Even after the Soviets 
left in 1989, the various Afghan political factions waged a battle for control of 
Afghanistan. In the 1990s, the radical Islamic Taliban emerged as the victor in the 
Afghan Civil War for control of the country (Carpenter, 2004; Schweich, 2008). During 
the Afghan civil war, all of the warring factions were heavily involved in the opium trade 
to finance their war efforts (Bagley, 2004; Carpenter, 2004; Taylor, 2006). 
Once the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, the Taliban passed an edict in 2001 
that "banned the cultivation of opium under pain of death" (Carpenter, 2004, p. 4). The 
Taliban had ulterior motives for doing so. During the civil war, the Taliban had 
stockpiled large quantities of opium to create a temporary scarcity of opium on the world 
market. This scarcity produced higher opium prices that boosted Taliban revenues 
(Carpenter, 2004; Schweich, 2008). In late 2001, in response to the 9111 terrorist attacks, 
the United States and its allies in the Northern Alliance overthrew the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan. Since this time, Taliban opium cultivation has grown to record numbers 
(Carpenter, 2004; Chouvy, 2006; Schweich, 2008). 
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According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (2003) Opium 
Survey, the illegal drug trade in Afghanistan alone amounts to $2.3 billion dollars per 
year, which is more than half of Afghanistan's legitimate gross domestic product. It is 
estimated that 6% to 8% of the Afghan population is involved either directly or indirectly 
in the drug trade. However, when taken into account the role of the extended family and 
clan structure in Afghan society, that percentage likely jumps to 20% to 30% of the 
population (Carpenter, 2004). 
According to the 2003 UNODC Opium Survey, the concentration of opium 
cultivation is in the central and southern regions of Afghanistan. Opium was also being 
cultivated in the Northern region along the eastern border with Pakistan and Tajikistan. 
However, the 2009 UNODC Opium Survey found that the Northern regions of 
Afghanistan are virtually poppy cultivation free. The concentration of opium cultivation 
is now in the southern region where the insurgency is concentrated (Bagley, 2004; 
Taylor, 2006). 
Understanding the past thirty years of Afghanistan'S history is integral to 
understanding the purpose of this study. By examining the history of Afghanistan, the six 
components of the heroin trade can be examined as a circular circuit. The historical 
record has shown that there have been disruptions or breaks in the heroin trade in the past 
and that various groups have used the heroin trade a source of funding. 
Previous literature has focused on the heroin trade from a variety of perspectives. 
One prominent viewpoint suggests that since cultivating poppies in Afghanistan is more 
financially lucrative than any other crop, it is difficult to implement a policy of 
substituting a different crop (Carpenter, 2004). The Afghan government has attempted to 
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pay fanners not to cultivate their tields with poppies and that has not worked. To date, 
there has been little to no successful crop substitution on any noticeable scale in 
Afghanistan (Taylor, 2006). Due to a variety of reasons, crop substitution is simply not 
viable in a country with such a poor infrastructure and crop irrigation system (Ward et aI, 
2008). Crop eradication has also been attempted half-heartedly. In 2006, Afghan 
president Hamid Karzai authorized opium crop eradication on the ground but would not 
approve aerial eradication, even though aerial crop eradication is more effective than 
ground eradication (Taylor, 2006). 
Since the Afghan government is incapable of projecting power in the southern and 
central regions ofthe country, the fanners take the money from the Afghan government 
to not grow poppies and then the drug lords come in and tell the farmers that they must 
still grow poppies. Farmers cannot go to the government for help since the government 
cannot project their power into the drug-lord-controlled regions. Since the drug lords are 
able to project power over the farmers in the regions the drug lords control, the farmers 
are left with no choice but to grow poppies. 
For many years, Afghan drug lords projected a false image of Afghan fanners, 
suggesting that poppy cultivation protected them from starvation. This image was used to 
influence fanners in supporting poppy cultivation and the ensuing drug trade (Carpenter, 
2004; Bagley, 2004; Taylor, 2006). While income gained from poppy cultivation does 
help fanners, prior to the Soviet invasion, Afghan fanners grew wheat, cotton and 
vegetables, all of which currently are in severe short supply in Afghanistan (Schweich, 
2008). In 2007, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) arrived at a 
startling conclusion. The UNODC produced a map showing that poppy cultivation had 
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become concentrated in the southern regions of Afghanistan, which was more associated 
with the insurgency and drug lords than with poverty (Schweich, 2008). 
The image of the starving farmer having to cultivate poppies in order to survive 
took a severe hit. The UNODC report showed that poor farmers were abandoning the 
poppy crop and that the poppy cultivation was concentrated in the wealthier Southern 
region of Afghanistan (UNODC, 2007). The UNODC report went on to show that close 
to 80% of the land devoted to the cultivation of poppies had been planted in 2005 and 
2006 (UNODC, 2007). The Afghan government insisted that they still needed more 
humanitarian aid to help their destitute farmers, even after having been shown the 
UNODC report and corresponding cultivation maps. The UNODC report was a wake-up 
call to the US Pentagon. The report clearly showed that poppy cultivation was no longer 
associated with humanitarian aid but was more closely associated with funding the 
insurgency and war (Schweich, 2008; UNODC, 2007). 
Several months after the 2007 UNODC report, the UNODC issued a discussion 
paper that reinforced the findings of the 2007 report. The report was titled "Is poverty 
driving the Afghan opium boom?" The report found that poverty was not the main factor 
in the expansion of opium cultivation. The vast majority of Afghan farmers in 
Afghanistan choose to grow licit crops instead of poppy (UNODC, 2008). The report 
concluded that the rise in cultivation occurred in the wealthier southern regions of 
Afghanistan, which have a large exposure to the insurgency. Therefore, it was this 
exposure to the insurgency and not poverty that drove farmers to cultivate poppies 
(UNODC, 2008). 
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According to Mansfield (2001), poppy cultivation is appealing to farmers since it 
is a non-perishable, low weight-height product and it is ideally suited to the war-ravaged 
physical infrastructure of Afghanistan. More so, opium as an annual crop has a virtually 
guaranteed market and provides a degree of economic security to farmers which other 
crops like fruit and vegetables cannot offer (Mansfield, 2001). Farmers have an 
economic incentive to grow poppies since the average annual household income in 
Afghanistan is approximately $2,000 US per year (Ward et aI, 2008). If Afghan farmers 
have a sustainable non-perishable crop, they will be able to live and support their 
families. 
At the heart of the Afghan drug trade is the cultivation of opium. Developing 
ways or methods to reduce and then ban opium cultivation would be a central tenet of any 
anti-narcotic eradication program. However, numerous authors to date, including Ward, 
Mansfield, Oldham and Byrd (2008) have stated any kind of attempt to seriously reduce 
opium cultivation is hindered by the extreme weakness of modem Afghan institutions, 
widespread corruption and inability of the Afghan government to enforce rule of law 
throughout the country. Anti-narcotic efforts by Afghan law enforcement and the 
legitimate Afghan government with the assistance from the U.S. led coalition forces have 
tried to stop poppy cultivation since the invasion in 2001, with poor results (Ward et aI, 
2008) 
Since the farmers are primarily responsible for the first level of the six steps of the 
drug trade, understanding the farmers' reasons for growing poppies is essential to any 
counter-narcotic strategy. If poppies aren't cultivated, they cannot be refined and, 
therefore, heroin cannot be produced. Moreover, no money will be made in the 
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transportation, distribution or sale of the heroin. There will be no money going back to 
the drug lords, who will then have no money to funnel or donate to support the 
insurgency. The discontinuation of poppy cultivation would produce a break in the 
circuit. The drug trade would grind to a halt if the primary ingredient of the main product 
was not being cultivated. 
Conversely, if there were a destabilized Afghanistan, then there would be no 
government interference in opium cultivation since the government would be unable to 
project its authority over the areas controlled by the drug lords. The drug lords could 
force farmers to grow as much poppy as the drug lords want. Cultivation would increase, 
and there would be further destabilization of the country produced by a battle for control 
of the drug trade amongst Afghan drug lords. Afghanistan would become a narco-state 
where rule of law would not be possible to impose. The insurgency would have free 
reign to do whatever it wanted. Afghanistan would once again become a breeding 
ground for terrorists, and the security threat posed by the Central Asian region would 
dramatically increase. 
According to the UNODC World Drug Report (2010), over 90% of the opiate-
processing laboratories in the world are located in Afghanistan. One of the key 
components to refining opiates from poppies into heroin is a precursor chemical known 
as acetic anhydride. According to the annual UNODC World Drug Report (UNODC 
2008, 2009 and 2010), all acetic anhydride has to be smuggled into Afghanistan. There is 
no known production facility in the country, nor is there any reported legitimate use for 
this chemical in Afghanistan (UNODC, 2010). Since 2007 there has been an 
international cooperation on not allowing the diversion of precursor chemicals to drug-
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producing countries, particularly Afghanistan. The controls that have been put in place 
by the international community have led to the price of a single liter of acetic anhydride 
in Afghanistan to fluctuate between $350 and $400 per liter (UNODC, 2010). This steep 
price for precursor chemicals is thought to have become a major cost factor in refining 
heroin (UNODC, 2009). 
Acetic anhydride is packaged in liter-sized glass bottles, five-gallon sized metal 
canisters and 55-gallon steel drums. The majority of the chemical is smuggled into 
Afghanistan via Pakistan (Strategypage.com, 2010). Once the chemical arrives in 
Pakistan, the acetic anhydride is transported into Afghanistan. Transportation is done via 
truck due to the weight, size and amounts needed for refinement. Due to the limited 
number of available roads, border guards at these crossing points are accustomed to be 
being bribed. Ten tons of raw opium can be refined into approximately 1.3 tons of 
heroin. To refine this quantity of raw opium takes 2.6 tons of acetic anhydride 
(Startegypage.com, 2010). Due to the large quantity of acetic anhydride needed to refine 
the heroin, a break in the acquisition of the chemical would cause the drug trade to come 
to a halt, representing another break in the circuit. This theory was partially proved out in 
the 1990s. While the civil war waged in Afghanistan, Pakistan curtailed the supply of 
acetic anhydride going to Afghanistan. Opium was still cultivated and produced in 
Afghanistan during this time, but the heroin destined for the far more lucrative foreign 
markets was not as readily available and the prices of heroin rose in the 1990s (Reuter & 
Trautmann, 2009; Stratgeypage.com, 2010). 
The second step in the drug trade is the refinement and production of the raw 
opium poppies into heroin. Any interruption in the refinement and production of opium 
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into heroin causes a break in the circuit. If chemicals needed to refine the raw opium are 
not getting into Afghanistan, then the heroin cannot be produced. If the heroin cannot be 
produced, then there is no product to transport, distribute or sell. There are no profits to 
be made, therefore there are no profits that are getting back to the drug lords. If they are 
not receiving money, they are unable to give funding to the insurgency. 
Refinement of opium into heroin is primarily done in Afghanistan. The major 
chemical precursor acetic anhydride is needed to refine the opium into heroin. Acetic 
anhydride is not manufactured in Afghanistan and needs to be smuggled into the country. 
Without acetic anhydride, refining opium into heroin would not be possible. Disrupting 
the flow of acetic anhydride into Afghanistan would cause a break in the circuit. This 
break has happened in the past when Pakistan had shut down its border with Afghanistan 
and stopped the flow of acetic anhydride into the country. 
The third step in the drug trade is the transportation of heroin out of Afghanistan 
into the world market. This is an area where corruption and geography playa vital role. 
From a geographic perspective, Afghanistan is a land-locked country. It is surrounded by 
Pakistan to the east, southeast and the south, Iran to the south and southwest, 
Turkmenistan to the northwest, Uzbekistan to the north and Tajikistan to the north as well 
(CIA, 2010). All of these countries have suffered as a result of the opium trade and some 
have gone to great lengths in an attempt to stop the flow of drugs. Iran in particular has 
the highest opioid dependency in the world due to its close proximity to inexpensive 
partially refined heroin and raw Afghan opium (Pagel, 2009). 
As a result of this high dependency, Iran constructed a $6 billion wall along its 
western border with Afghanistan in an attempt to cut off a major trafficking route of the 
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Afghan drug lords (Pagel, 2009). However, due to the pervasive culture of corruption 
amongst the local officials, coupled with the increased opium production in Afghanistan 
since the fall of the Taliban, such efforts have been largely unsuccessful. Iran's anti-
narcotic efforts are an example of a single-scope approach to the drug trade. Iran's effort 
was an attempt to break the circuit by cutting off major drug trafficking routes. 
Due to the countries surrounding Afghanistan, these border countries are directly 
involved in the transportation of heroin leaving the region. The countries surrounding 
Afghanistan have been adversely affected by the heroin trade, particularly Iran, which has 
the highest opium dependency in the world (Pagel, 2009). Iran attempted to disrupt the 
flow of heroin by building a wall along its border with Afghanistan. Iran attempted to 
break the circuit by shutting down its borders. However, due to rampant corruption in the 
region, this effort has been less successful than hoped. 
Corruption is rampant in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan, located to the 
east of Afghanistan, is generally considered a failed state by the world community 
(Medler,2005). For that reason, Pakistan is viewed as being incapable of any meaningful 
counter-narcotics efforts and the lawless lands between Pakistan and Afghanistan are 
proof of this (Taylor, 2006). Pakistan is a major crossover point for drugs flowing out of 
Afghanistan and for money and chemicals needed to break down the opium coming back 
into Afghanistan. Historically, the people that populate the border between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan share a common ethnic and cultural makeup, and smuggling has been a way 
of life for these peoples for decades (Medler, 2005). Pay for civil servants in Pakistan is 
poor and paying bribes to civil servants is common (Medler, 2005; Jones, 2008). Even 
CIRCULAR NATURE OF THE AFGHAN DRUG TRADE 
more so, along the more remote border areas, bribes are paid to border guards and law 
enforcement as normal course of business (Medler, 2005). 
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In Afghanistan, the government is unable to provide basic services to its people, 
the security forces cannot protect local villages and the population is losing faith in the 
government (Jones, 2007). The Afghan government is unable to enforce any sustained 
and lasting anti-narcotic efforts against the drug lords. The government's inability to lead 
feeds the corruption that is plaguing the country as well as further destabilizing the 
country (Jones, 2007). By its own inabilities, the Afghan government aids the drug trade 
(Taylor, 2007). 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are all parts of the former Soviet Union. 
All three are considered some of the poorest countries in the world. Per capita income in 
2009 for Turkmenistan was $3,420, compared with $2,890 for Uzbekistan and $700 for 
Tajikistan (World Bank, 2009). Due to such low income, corruption is prevalent in these 
former Soviet states. The low wages paid to border guards, police and local government 
officials helps proliferate the drug trade (Bagley, 2004; Medler, 2005). 
Corruption is rampant in all the bordering countries around Afghanistan. The 
amount of money that drug lords pay the border guards, police and local officials is an 
insignificant fraction of the value of the heroin that is being trafficked (Ward et aI, 2008). 
Yet to the border guards, police and local officials, the payoff money they receive is a 
large sum of money. Due to the poor pay that civil servants receive in these countries, 
the drug lords are able to easily bribe the civil servants to allow their shipments to go 
through. The borders in all of these countries are porous, and the effective policing of 
these borders is hindered by the poor pay that is paid to police (Medler, 2005). 
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Without the culture of corruption that is rampant in Afghanistan and the 
surrounding countries, the heroin trade would not be able to flourish. Corruption plays its 
part in the transporting of heroin out of Afghanistan and the smuggling of needed 
supplies to refine heroin into Afghanistan. Low wages paid to border guards, police and 
local officials contribute greatly to the problem of corruption. The low per capita income 
in surrounding countries further aids the proliferation of corruption. Eliminating the 
culture of corruption in these countries would aid in disrupting the flow of heroin out of 
Afghanistan and the flow of supplies into the country. This would result in another break 
in the circuit. 
The drug trafficking networks that exist in Central Asia have been in use for many 
years and simultaneously shutting down all of these routes is not possible or feasible 
(Medler, 2005; Taylor, 2006). This third step of the drug trade is the most difficult place 
to break the circuit, due to the numerous countries and trafficking routes that are 
involved. In the 1990s, when Pakistan shut its borders down to drug trafficking, the 
trafficking shifted to Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Taylor, 2006). 
Pakistan attempted to break the circuit, but due to the numerous alternate trafficking 
routes, heroin still flowed out of Afghanistan and the drug trade continued. 
The fourth step in the drug trade is the distribution and sale of heroin in the 
consumer or end cities. According to the 2011 UNODC World Drug Report, UNODC 
estimates that there were between 12 and 21 million opiate users worldwide in 2009. This 
same report showed that in 2009, an estimated 375 metric tons of heroin were consumed 
by those users. This was up from 2005 when the 2005 UNODC World Drug Report 
showed 12-14 million opiate users worldwide. "Opiate users generated an estimated $68 
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billion dollars in revenue for drug traffickers in 2009 with $60 billion of that from 
Afghan opiates" (UNODC, 2011, p. 45). While the Afghan drug lords have a substantial 
influence on the Afghan economy, the largest profits in the heroin trade stem from the 
international traffickers, not the Afghan drug lords themselves (UNODC, 2011). The 
international drug traffickers distribute the drugs to the consumer countries. Despite the 
fact that the Afghan drug lords account for only a small slice of heroin trade profits 
globally, their slice is powerful in Afghanistan due to the poor socio-economic conditions 
and the low per capita income in Afghanistan. The amount of money that the drug lords 
are making compared to the average Afghan citizen is astronomical (Schweich, 2008). 
Consumption of heroin is on the rise. The United States is the primary export 
country for Afghan heroin (UNODC, 2011). Interestingly enough, poppy production has 
fallen in 2011 (UNODC), however, that was due to crop disease of poppy fields and not 
due to a lessening of demand by consumers. Countries throughout the world have tried to 
stop the import of illegal drugs, but these prohibitionist strategies and policies have done 
next to nothing to stem the flow of drugs (Carpenter, 2004; Chouvy, 2006: Taylor, 2006). 
As long as there is a demand for illegal heroin and there is such an immense lucrative 
profit to be made in drug trafficking, the heroin will continue to flow (Taylor, 2006). 
The number of heroin users worldwide is on the rise. Opiate users in 2009 
generated profits of $68 billion dollars with $60 billion of that coming from Afghan 
opiates. The split on the profits from the heroin trade vary with the Afghan drug lords 
receive a smaller share of the profits in comparison to the distributors and traffickers 
themselves. However, the profits made by the Afghan drug lords are incredibly high for 
the region when compared to per capita income. Disruption of these distribution 
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networks would cause a break in the circuit. Examining these factors provides insight 
into ways to possibly disrupt or break the circuit of the heroin trade. 
Organized crime is heavily involved in the drug trade (UNODC, 2004). These 
criminal networks are well-organized and structured. This structured system makes the 
distribution and sale of the drugs easier to accomplish. These organized crime groups 
purchase heroin wholesale from the drug lords once it has left Afghanistan (Medler, 
2005). The heroin is not purchased in Afghanistan; rather, it is purchased at exit 
locations along the smuggling routes. The heroin is concealed inside shipments of 
legitimate goods and moved from Afghanistan to Pakistan, where the heroin is then 
transported by road and rail to the main Pakistani port of Karachi (Medler, 2005). The 
port of Karachi is a major international shipment hub that moves high volumes of 
containerized cargo and bulk goods, as well as contraband like drugs and weapons 
(Medler, 2005). 
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It is at this point in the drug trade, step number five, where the money begins to 
flow back to the drug lords. The money flow extends outward to the surrounding 
countries of Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tjikistan, Turkmenitsan, Turkey, Ukraine and 
Russia. These travel and exit countries are where the Afghan drug lords are paid for their 
goods (Mullen, 2010). These are countries where the wholesaling of Afghan heroin 
occurs, with most of the heroin being sold to transnational organized crime groups 
(Medler, 2005). Afghan drug lords deal in cash. There is no wiring of funds to an 
account in some offshore country. Cash is smuggled back into Afghanistan along the 
same routes that the heroin was smuggled out on (Ward, et aI, 2008). Once again, due to 
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the porous borders of all of these countries, the profits get back into the hands of the 
Afghan drug lords (Mullen, 2010). 
A break in the money-How circuit would cause the drug trade to grind to a halt. 
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The money generated by the drug trade is used to keep financing the drug trade (Medler, 
2005). The money that comes back into Afghanistan is used to pay for chemicals to 
break down the poppies, bribe border guards, police and local officials, pay the people 
that the drug lords employ, fatten the coffers of the drug lords and to fund the insurgency 
(UNODC,2008). With no money coming back to the drug lords, they would be unable 
to pay the farmers to cultivate poppy, purchase the acetic anhydride to refine the opium 
into heroin, or bribe the border guards, police and local officials along the smuggling 
routes, and the drug lords would not have money to give to the insurgency. 
The money generated from the sale of Afghan heroin Hows back to the drug lords 
along the same routes that the heroin left the country. These funds are used for paying 
the farmers, bribing the border guards, funding the insurgency and fattening the coffers of 
the drug lords. If there is a disruption of the How of money, it affects the entire heroin 
trade. A disruption in the How of money causes a break in the circuit. No money coming 
into Afghanistan would mean that the drug lords would be unable to pay for the 
cultivation of poppies and not be able to afford the necessary chemicals needed to refine 
the heroin. This break in the circuit would cause the drug trade to come to a halt until the 
circuit could be reestablished. 
The sixth and final step in the drug trade is the giving of funds by drug lords to 
the insurgents. When the Taliban was in charge of Afghanistan, the government received 
funding from the drug lords by taxing all aspects of the drug trade (Cilluffo, 2000). The 
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Taliban taxed the opium harvest, the refining laboratories and the transportation of the 
heroin to all exit points out of the country (Cilluffo, 2000). Currently, it is not known as 
far as an exact figure how much money is being given to the insurgency by the drug 
lords. There is no bank statement from a drug lord that will show they gave "X" amount 
of dollars to the insurgency in a given month. Previous authors have concluded that 
money is being provided to the insurgency to fund their efforts against the Afghan 
government and coalition forces (Ward et aI, 2008). 
In 2004, John Walters, who was the Director for White House Office of Drug 
Control Policy said, "drug cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan are undermining the 
rule of law and putting money in the pockets of the terrorists we are trying to neutralize," 
(Bagley, 2004, p. 5). The insurgency is comprised of various groups, with many of them 
being former Taliban. According to Schmidt (2010), "although the Taliban did not 
mastermind the drug trade, it is clear that they benefit from it financially" (Schmidt, 
2010, p. 63). Schmidt (2010) concluded the Taliban "use revenues generated by it to 
purchase new weapons and pick up new recruits in Pakistan. Once the Taliban's 
financial arteries linked to the poppy are cut off, it will experience a major blow to its 
organization" (Schmidt, 2010, p. 63). Experts, including Taylor (2004) and Johnson 
(2007), agree that the opium trade funded terrorism, inhibited reconstruction and created 
a financial and locally supported power base for the insurgency to launch attacks on 
coalition forces, further destabilizing the government and the country. 
Schmidt (2010) stated that since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, one thing has 
become clear: the new Taliban have been active participants and "have aided and abetted 
opium cultivation on a scale unmatched to anything Afghanistan has produced in the 
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past" (Schmidt, 2010, p. 62). For example, in 1999 Afghanistan produced 4,500 tons of 
opium, which is 15 times the output of the preceding 20 years (UNODC, 2001). The 
business partnership between the drug lords and the Taliban has grown deeper since the 
invasion in 2001. The lack of trust among Afghanistan's citizens in the Afghan 
government has also given opium value (Schmidt, 2010). Krutzmann observed that 
"opium is not only a commodity, but also a currency at the same time. Poppy is the 
lifeblood of the Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan" (Schmidt, 2010, p. 63). 
Previous literature has shown that the heroin trade has funded the Taliban when 
they were in power as well as providing funding to the current insurgency. The 
insurgency has been at the forefront of attacking the Afghan government as well as 
coalition forces. These attacks have led to destabilization of the Afghan government as 
well as the country itself. Since the major source of insurgency funding is the heroin 
trade, disruptions of the trade affects the insurgency. Without the funding provided by 
the heroin trade the insurgency would be unable to purchase weapons, ammunition and 
bomb-making materials. Lack of these resources would inhibit their ability to launch 
attacks and further their attempts to destabilize Afghanistan. 
The UNODC reports from 2005 thru 2010 showed that opium cultivation more 
than doubled between 2005 and 2007, from 4,000 metric tons to 8,200 metric tons. Since 
2008, the cultivation has decreased back to the levels seen in 2005 (UNODC, 2010) 
where 4,000 metric tones of opium were cultivated. Previous authors, including Taylor 
(2007) and Schmidt (2010), stated that the insurgency activities against the Afghan 
government and the coalition forces increased greatly in the years between 2005 and 
2007. The numbers of attacks increased, as did the number of casualties resulting from 
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these attacks (Schmidt, 2010). Coincidently, other authors have argued that the decline in 
insurgent attacks resulted from the "surge" of United States troops in 2010, coupled with 
the diseases that hit the poppy crop in 2009 (Stenersen, 2010). Regardless, the fact 
remains that the drug lords give money and aid to the insurgency. 
A break in the circuit of money going to the Afghan insurgency would have an 
impact on the entire Afghan drug trade. Since the insurgents themselves have become 
immersed in the drug trade, if money did not come back to them, they would not be able 
to fund their efforts against the Afghan government and the coalition forces. The 
partnership with the drug lords could fall into jeopardy, resulting in a turf war between 
the insurgents and drug lords for control of the drug trade. Under such circumstances, the 
insurgency would step up their attacks to get the money flowing in and the drugs flowing 
out of Afghanistan, further destabilizing an already unstable country. This set of 
circumstances clearly illustrates the circular nature of the Afghan drug trade and the 
Afghan insurgency and shows how the common goal of these groups to further 
destabilize Afghanistan binds them in an ongoing, mutually reliant relationship. 
Examining the previous literature on the Afghan heroin trade forms the launching 
point of this study. Understanding the historical and economical significance of the six 
components of the heroin trade is vital to understanding the purpose of this study. The 
circular nature of the heroin trade is examined. Breaking the circuit of the circle or 
disrupting the circuit causes a halt to the drug trade. A stop in the drug trade means a 
stop to the funding provided to the insurgency. Destabilization and corruption play their 
part in the heroin trade and need to be included since without both of them, the heroin 
trade would be hard-pressed to flourish the way it currently does. 
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Methods 
Methodology 
Babbie (2010) stated that the purpose of most types of social research is to find 
out the unknovvTI. The unknown that this study seeks to find is if there is a circular 
pattern to the Afghan Heroin trade and to see what roles corruption and destabilization 
play in the trade. In order to provide a sufficient amount of information on this subject, 
exploratory means will be utilized to familiarize the researcher with the topic (Babbie, 
2010). The exploratory means of this study include second source data from peer-
reviewed journals, scholarly articles, World Drug Reports, published books, websites and 
newsprint articles. 
A qualitative research approach will be utilized to examine and answer the 
research questions in this study. According to Babbie (2010), the research conducted 
seeks to provide answers to a phenomenon. In the case of this study the phenomenon is 
the heroin trade. The results obtained through the use of qualitative research will help 
answer the research questions that have been posed. Furthermore, since an aspect of 
exploratory research is, "to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study," 
(Babbie, 2010, p. 92), the information gleaned from this study may lead to further 
research on the circular nature of the Afghan heroin trade and the roles of destabilization 
and corruption in the Afghan heroin trade. 
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Research Design 
This research is a qualitative examination of the circular nature of the various 
components of the heroin drug trade in Afghanistan. The research is designed to identify 
independent variables such as opium cultivation, the production of opium into heroin, the 
transportation of heroin to the world market, the distribution and sales of heroin in end 
cities, the movement of profits from the sale of heroin back to the drug lords, and the 
provision of funds by the drug lords to the insurgency. This research addresses the 
following research questions: 
RQ 1 Is there is a circular pattern to the Afghan drug trade and the insurgency? RQ2 
What role do destabilization and corruption play in the heroin trade and insurgency in 
Afghanistan? 
Procedure 
Babbie (2010) defined content analysis as, "the study of recorded human 
communications, such as books, websites, paintings and laws" (Babbie, 2010, p. 333). 
Based on a detailed content analysis of the Afghan heroin trade, I was able to demarcate 
the steps in heroin manufacture and distribution of heroin. The electrical circuit provides 
a convenient metaphor for understanding and discussing the Afghan heroin trade. 
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Results 
This researched addressed the question of whether a circular pattern exists 
between the Afghan drug trade and the insurgency. The answer to that question is a 
resounding "yes." The drug trade starts with the farmers who cultivate the poppies. The 
next step is to process and refine the opium into heroin, which takes place primarily in 
Afghanistan. Chemicals are needed to refine the opium into heroin. These chemicals 
need to be smuggled into Afghanistan. The refined heroin is then transported out of 
Afghanistan through neighboring countries along long used drug trafficking routes. 
Corruption of police officers, border guards and local officials is part and parcel of the 
drug trade and is necessary to get the heroin out into the world market. 
Once the heroin leaves Afghanistan, it is transported along drug trafficking routes 
through Pakistan, Iran, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is along these routes 
that the majority of heroin is purchased by drug traffickers who pay a wholesale price for 
the heroin. These traffickers are primarily transnational organized crime groups that have 
the means, ability, organization and money to get the drugs out the end cities for 
distribution and sale to the eventual heroin consumer. Price markups for the heroin occur 
all along the transportation and distribution network. Chossudovsky (2005) stated the 
amount of money generated by the heroin trade once it leaves Afghanistan is between 80 
to 100 times what the Afghan farmer was paid to cultivate the crop. 
The money generated from the wholesale of the heroin flows back to the Afghan 
drug lords along the same path that the drugs exited the country. In addition to the heroin 
profits, chemicals such as acetic anhydride needed to break down and refine opium 
poppies are transported back into Afghanistan. Once again, corruption plays its role in 
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allowing the money and supplies to go back into Afghanistan. The profits that drug lords 
get back from the sale of the heroin gives them the ability to fund the insurgency. The 
more money that the drug lords earn means that they have more money to give to the 
insurgency. More money to the insurgency means they are able to conduct more attacks, 
which further destabilizes Afghanistan and gets the insurgency closer to their goal of a 
destabilized Afghanistan. Any break in this circular flow of drugs and money causes a 
major disruption to the Afghan drug trade, which in turn ripples down to the insurgency 
and their ability to get funding and launch attacks. 
A break anywhere in the circle affects the flow of heroin out of Afghanistan and 
flow of money back into Afghanistan. A break in the circuit was defined as any type of 
anti-narcotic law enforcement actions aimed at stopping the flow of drugs out of 
Afghanistan, disrupting distribution and transportation networks, growing of poppies to 
produce heroin or the refinement of poppies into heroin. According to the UNODC 
World Drug Report (2011) the number of heroin seizures doubled between 2005 and 
2009. In 2005,348 metric tons of heroin were seized and that number increased to 653 
metric tons in 2009. There was a major increase in opium production in Afghanistan 
between 2005 and 2007 and since more heroin was being produced and transported, there 
was more chances for law enforcement to interdict and seize the illegal drugs (UNODC, 
2011). 
Any break in the circuit has implications for all facets of the drug trade. Since the 
drug trade is so inter-connected, any kind of disruption or break at one point affects the 
other components. For example, when Pakistan shut its border with Afghanistan in the 
1990s, the primary export route for Afghan heroin was cut-off, as was the avenue of 
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money corning back into Afghanistan. This interrupted the flow of drugs from the 
country as well as the money corning back in. This also affected the Taliban government 
since they taxed the drug trade and lost income when the border was shut down. 
For a time, the Afghan drug trade carne to a halt until the drug lords were able to 
re-establish and start using alternative trafficking routes through Iran, Tajikstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The new trafficking routes re-established the circuit, but 
at a cost. The new trafficking routes resulted in additional expenses incurred by the drug 
lords in order to move their drugs and get their money. The drug lords had to pay bribes 
to border guards, police and local officials in areas where they did not have to be paid 
when the Pakistan border was open. New routes for the trafficking meant establishing 
and building new relationships along the alternate routes. 
Another potential break in the circuit could be produced by a reduction in poppy 
production. Whether through eradication efforts by law enforcement or crop failure due 
to drought or disease, the lack of poppy production would result in a lack of drug to 
refine, transport, distribute, sell or yield profits to the Afghan drug lords. All along the 
heroin trade, from poppy cultivation to heroin consumption by users, each group involved 
in the trade makes money, so reduced poppy production not only affects Afghan drug 
lords but individuals and organized crime groups all along the production cycle, from 
bribed border guards to international traffickers. 
Since acetic anhydride is a primary chemical needed to refine opium to heroin, if 
it is unable to be smuggled into Afghanistan, heroin could not be produced. If there is no 
heroin then there is nothing to transport, distribute or sell. If there is nothing to sell then 
there is no profit to profit from. No profits will then get back to the drug lords who will 
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then have no money to fund the insurgency. The insurgency will not have the funds it 
needs to achieve its goals and will have to look to other sources for funding its activities. 
If there is a break in any of the six components of the drug trade circle, the drug trade 
comes to a halt until the break can be fixed, by-passed or re-established. 
The second question posed was regarding the roles corruption and destabilization 
play in the circle. Numerous authors, including Bagley (2004), Taylor (2006), Jones 
(2007), Pagel (2009) and Mullen (2010), have stated that corruption in Afghanistan is 
absolutely essential for the drug trade to exist and flourish. All of these authors agree 
that without the levels of corruption that exist in Afghanistan, the drug trade would not be 
as profitable or at all possible as it has been to date. The corruption goes to the heart of 
the destabilization of Afghanistan. The Afghan government is viewed by many of the 
citizens of Afghanistan as corrupt and not trustworthy. This attitude by Afghan citizens 
is prevalent since the legitimate Afghan government is incapable of enforcing the rule of 
law or providing the basic services to its citizenry. Without the support and backing of 
its people, the Afghan government inadvertently feeds the insurgency. The insurgency is 
able to recruit bodies and sympathizers to their cause, which helps the insurgents reach 
their end goal: a destabilized Afghanistan. 
Transparency International's corruption index in 2010 listed Afghanistan in 
position 176 out of 178. The only countries that had higher levels of corruption were 
Myanmar and Somalia. Tajikistan was listed in position 152, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan were listed in position 172, Pakistan was listed in position 143, and Iran was 
listed in position 146 (Transparency International, 2010). With such high levels of 
corruption in all of these countries, any kind of anti-narcotic law enforcement will face 
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major challenges. Due to the low wages paid to civil servants in all of these countries, 
corruption is a way of life and is embedded in each of these respective societies. 
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Discussion/Conclusion 
Previous research on the subject of the heroin drug trade in Afghanistan has 
shown that the insurgency benefits financially from the drug trade. Financial benefit 
from the heroin drug trade goes back to the mujahidin resistance fighters who fought 
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The ensuing participants in the civil war 
after the Soviets departed also benefited from the drug trade, including the eventual 
winner of that civil war, the Taliban. Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the 
insurgency that has risen against the Afghan government has also been benefiting from 
the drug trade. 
The aim of this study was to reflect that the Afghan heroin trade is similar to a 
circular electrical circuit. A break or disruption anywhere in the circuit causes a halt in 
the drug trade until the circuit is re-established. A disruption can include disease of the 
poppy crop, shutting down of drug trafficking routes, seizure of heroin by law 
enforcement, disruption in the supply lines into Afghanistan of chemicals needed to 
refine opium into heroin, or any of the other factors reviewed in this study. 
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History has shown that there have been times over the past 30 years where the 
heroin trade has been temporarily halted. The key to the last statement is "temporarily." 
In recent history, there has not been a time when heroin was not being trafficked out of 
Afghanistan. Future research can focus on a multi-scope approach to disrupting the 
circuit at numerous points and not just focusing on one of the six areas of the circle. In 
World War II, when the Allies invaded France on D-Day, there was a multi-pronged front 
that stretched the lines of the Germans. The idea behind this was to stretch the lines so 
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thin that eventually a break could be made in the German lines and the Allies would be 
able to advance off the beaches and into France. 
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The same multi-scope approach can be used to attack the heroin trade. Break one 
circuit and it temporarily stops the drug trade. However, break two, three or four circuits 
and the trade will come to a standstill. Similarly, if you blow a breaker in an electrical 
panel, power is shut down until you can flip the breaker switch in the panel. If you blow 
three, four or five breakers, there is a high probability that the entire electrical panel will 
have to be replaced. This is a large project, requiring a person with specific technical 
skills and it takes longer to rectify than just switching a breaker switch. When the circuit 
has been broken is the time when the drug trade is most vulnerable. 
Much has been written on the corruption that plagues not only Afghanistan but 
also the surrounding countries of Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. The drug trade and the insurgency feed off of the corruption. The Afghan 
government inadvertently feeds the insurgency and the drug trade by its inability to 
govern and project its legitimate authority throughout the country. The Afghan 
government's inability to provide basic services to its citizens, rebuild an infrastructure 
that has been decimated by thirty years of war, and to provide security to rural Afghans 
perpetuates the Afghan belief that their country is unstable and that their government is 
incapable of governing. The insurgency uses this belief to recruit people to its cause. 
The drug lords prefer a destabilized Afghanistan. It is better for their business if the 
Afghan government is unable to mount any serious anti-narcotic efforts against them. 
The longer the Afghan government is unable to project the rule of law and govern 
its people, the longer the battle with the insurgents will continue. Part of stabilizing 
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Afghanistan is for the Afghan government to deal with the massive corruption that is 
rampant in its entire organization. Battling corruption derives two benefits for the 
Afghan government. First, it shows the people that corruption will be not tolerated and 
that there are criminal consequences to being involved with corruption. Battling 
corruption gives the government legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry. Secondly, by 
battling corruption the government is taking a key component of the heroin drug trade 
away from the drug lords. If the drug lords are unable to bribe corrupt border guards, 
police or local officials, then the heroin will not be able to leave the country. If the 
heroin cannot be exported then there will be no distribution, transportation or sale of the 
heroin. There will be no money flowing back to the drug lords, which means there will 
be no money to funnel to the insurgency. The Afghan government hits the insurgency 
where it will feel it the most, in their funding pockets. For the Afghan government, 
battling corruption is win-win. 
Studying the heroin trade as a circular pattern provides insight into a problem that 
has had devastating effects in Afghanistan and the surrounding countries, as well as every 
country and end city throughout the world where Afghan heroin ends up being consumed. 
Finding ways to stop the flow of heroin out of Afghanistan and the flow of money into 
Afghanistan by using this circular approach to the heroin trade will aid law enforcement 
in anti-narcotic measures and operations. Less heroin mean less profits for the drug 
lords, which will mean less money to give to the insurgency. Less money for the 
insurgency means less of an ability on their part to launch attacks, which further 
destabilize the country. This in tum will allow the Afghan government the ability to 
project power throughout the country, including areas currently controlled by the drug 
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lords, thereby unifying the fractured country. Less heroin being produced also means 
less heroin available for consumption. In the end, by reducing or eliminating the supply, 
the demand may also go down. This would benefit the drug treatment budget of every 
end city where heroin is being sold and consumed. 
The two primary social powers in Afghanistan are the legitimate Afghan 
government and the heroin trading drug lords. Afghan citizens fall under the control of 
one group or the other. Currently, the legitimate Afghan government is unable to provide 
rule of law and social order to all parts of the country. This is due in part to the 
government's own inabilities due to internal corruption and the power and influence of 
the Afghan drug lords. Since the Afghan drug lords are in control of the southern drug 
producing areas of the country, they are able to exert social control over the population. 
The Afghan government and drug lords are diametrically opposed when it comes to their 
ideas and values. For these reasons, Conflict Theory is an appropriate criminological 
theory to use when researching the heroin trade. 
Using this study as a jumping off point, future research should focus on ways to 
interrupt or break the circuit of the heroin trade. Each component should be studied in 
order to find weak links in the component and ways for law enforcement to exploit those 
weak links in order to disrupt or break the circle of the drug trade. Once each weakness 
of the various components has been identified, a multiple-pronged approach to disrupt or 
break the various components of the heroin trade simultaneously should be a focus. A 
multi-pronged approach to the heroin trade will give law enforcement the greatest chance 
of success in eliminating the heroin trade. 
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